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The Role of the Prosecution and Defense
Function Standards: Stagnant or Progressive?
ELLEN S. PODGOR*
This Essay examines the role of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: The Prosecution
and Defense Function Standards, looking at language when initially drafted to
language being considered in the proposed fourth edition. It focuses on the preliminary
sections of the Standards that outline the intended role of the Standards and considers
how courts have used these Standards in court decisions. It also notes how the
Standards serve a hortatory role, providing internal guidance to prosecutors and
defense counsel. An overriding question is whether these Standards serve a legitimate
function in the criminal justice process?
Placing the question of the role of the Standards in a specific context, this Essay
examines the drafters' approach to jury selection and specifically to peremptory strikes
based on sexual orientation. The drafters' failure to explicitly include "sexual
orientation" as an impermissible category for peremptory strikes of jurors, leaves the
Standards merely endorsing existing constitutional criteria, which raises the question of
whether the Standards have any purpose. This Essay advocates against the approach
taken by the drafters, as it offers little advancement in the law and perpetuates existing
bias. As hortatory standards, it is unnecessary to limit the rules to existing law. More
importantly, by failing to expand the category of impermissible peremptory challenges,
it is a missed opportunity to offer progressive legal reform.
* Gary R. Trombley Family White-Collar Crime Research Professor, Stetson University
College of Law. The Author thanks Dean Darby Dickerson and Stetson University College of Law for
their research support, and research assistants Rachel A. Kestenbaum, Ryan Schmidt, and Christina L.
Kimball. Thanks also go to Susan Hillenbrand, Project Director, Criminal Justice Standards Project,
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INTRODUCTION
What is the role of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for
Prosecution and Defense Functions? What purpose do they serve? And
how are they, can they, and should they be used? When embarking on a
review of the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards, it is
important to first examine the purpose of these Standards and the role
they serve in our criminal justice process.
Several issues are at the heart of this discussion. First is whether the
Standards are hortatory and subject only to internal usage. Second is
whether, even if hortatory and not the basis for discipline, judges can use
the Standards as a basis for ascertaining an appropriate level of attorney
conduct. This second question is particularly important in cases alleging
prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, in
looking at the function of these Standards, it is also important to consider
whether they should reflect the current state of the law or offer a
progressive or reformative approach.
The role of ethical statements is a question that is not unique to the
ABA Criminal Justice Standards. For example, the United States
Attorneys' Manual presently offers guidelines ("DOJ Guidelines") that
are explicitly limited to internal use.' These guidelines serve a tenuous
role in the federal system, in part because there is little chance that the
I. According to the DOJ Guidelines,
The Manual provides only internal Department of Justice guidance. It is not intended to,
does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are any limitations
hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIfED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § I-IO. O (2009).
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courts will require compliance.! They do, however, serve an important
educative role to those serving in the Department of Justice, especially
for newcomers to the office who can learn some of the policies by
reviewing the DOJ Guidelines.3 Whether these guidelines should be used
by courts raises some concerns, because if subjected to increased outside
scrutiny, the existence of clear guidelines could be hampered. As stated
in United States v. Ng, a case in which the defense contended that the
government had violated its "Petite" policy, "[t]o hold the policy legally
enforceable would be to invite the Attorney General to scrap it, which
would hardly be in the public interest."'
Ethical rules typically provide limits as to when they can be used by
outsiders, like courts and private litigants. One finds statements in both
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Judicial
Conduct that limit the use of these rules when someone wants to apply
them beyond the disciplinary process.s
Likewise, the discussion of whether the Standards should be a
restatement of existing norms is also a debate that occurs beyond this
context. For example, a constant struggle in the American Law Institute
is the role of the Restatements. Should they merely restate the current
law, give an emphasis to the majority approach, or take a position that
may be in the minority but which offers a more reasoned and progressive
2. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary
Justice", 13 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 167 (2004) (discussing the lack of remedies for failing to abide
by the DOJ Guidelines).
3. See generally Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. I (1971) (discussing the benefits of having guidelines for prosecutors).
4. 699 F.2d 63,71 (2d Cir. 1983).
5. For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide:
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In
addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy,
such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide
guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of
the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural
weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning
a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an
antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the
Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's
violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 20 (2010). The Model Code of Judicial Conduct states:
The Code is designed to provide guidance to judges and candidates for judicial office
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. It is not
designed or intended as a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the
purpose of the Code would be subverted if the Code were invoked by lawyers for mere
tactical advantage in a proceeding.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2004).
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approach?6 The struggle between perpetuating the status quo and moving
to improve the legal system with thoughtful analysis is a continuing
debate.'
This Essay examines these two questions: the role of the Standards
and whether they should be progressive. Encompassed within this
discussion are questions of whether the Standards are effective and
enforceable.
This Essay commences with an overview of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice for Prosecution and Defense Functions. These two sets
of Standards serve as parts three-Prosecution Function 8-and four-
Defense Function'-of the Criminal Justice Standards, which is a
multivolume work that had its initial sections passed in 1968.o These two
sets of Standards are somewhat unique from other parts of the Criminal
Justice Standards," as they focus specifically on the role of attorneys in
each dimension of the adversarial process as opposed to the process
itself." The remaining twenty-one sets of the Criminal Justice Standards
address many areas important to those operating in the criminal arena.
For example, one finds separate Criminal Justice Standards for areas
such as Mental Health," Guilty Pleas, 4 Providing Defense Services,"
Sentencing, 6 and Speedy Trial." As one might imagine, there are many
6. See generally Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common
Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205, 207 (2007) ("[Tihis article presents three different perspectives on the
Restatement movement.").
7. Professor Adams describes the "three perspectives on the Restatement movement" as being
that the Restatements are (i) "a veritable formalist anachronism that have failed to countenance the
important developments in jurisprudence over the last century," (2) "actually more progressive than
many have assumed," and (3) "that the Restatements represent an effective, albeit purposefully
conservative, reform movement." Id.
8. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION (3 d ed. 1993).
9. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
1o. About Criminal Justice Standards, ABA CRIM. JUST. SEc., http://new.abanet.org/sections/
criminaljustice/Pages/Standards.aspx (last visited May 23, 2011).
I I. See generally Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years
of Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 1o (discussing the history of the Criminal Justice
Standards).
12. These are not the only standards that focus on roles of individuals in the criminal justice
process. Standards 6-1.i to 6-4.6 provide standards for trial judges. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE (3d ed. 2000).
13. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MENTAL HEALTH H§ 7-1.1 to 7-10.12 (1989). See generally
B.J. George, Jr., The American Bar Association's Mental Health Standards: An Overview, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 338 (1985) (discussing the evolution and analysis of the Mental Health Standards).
14. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY §§ 14-1.1 to 14-4.1 (3d ed. 1999).
15. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES H§ 5-1.1 to 5-8.3 (3d ed. 1992).
16. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING §§ 18-1.1 to 18-9.1 (3d ed. 1994).
17. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPEEDY TRIAL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES
§§ 12-1.1 tO 12-4.5 (3d ed. 2oo6).
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overlapping areas covered throughout the various parts of the Criminal
Justice Standards. 8
This Essay examines the evolution of these two specific sets of the
Standards, the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, from
their inception to the proposed revisions in the draft fourth edition. It
focuses on the preliminary section of each of the Standards, because the
preliminary section provides the contours of the intended role that the
Standards should play in the criminal justice system. This Essay notes
proposed language changes in the proposed Standards that perhaps
could implicate the current role of the Standards. It also looks at how
courts have used these Standards, noting the key provisions being cited
in court decisions.
This Essay then places the debate about the appropriate role of the
Standards in context by examining one specific area: the selection of
jurors and the use of peremptory challenges by a party. Unlike race and
gender, the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether it is a constitutional
violation to use a peremptory strike premised on a prospective juror's
sexual orientation. The drafters of the Standards adhere to the existing
constitutional requirements and fail to offer guidance beyond what is
expressed in the law. It is contended here that the approach used in the
current draft offers a stagnant presentation that does little to improve
our criminal justice process. It uses an artificial limit that is anti-
progressive and, in fact, perpetuates a bias in the law. In light of the
hortatory role of the Standards, this approach seems unnecessary.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FUNCTION OF THE STANDARDS
A preliminary section in both the Prosecution Function Standards
and the Defense Function Standards provides language that focuses on
the role of these Standards. This section makes clear that the Standards
do not reach a level of being disciplinary rules. But whether the
Standards offer guidance in evaluating the conduct of a prosecutor or
defense attorney is a more difficult question, as the answer may depend
I8. Although the Standards have a web presence, there has been little coordination via hyperlinks
among the parts of the Standards. See Criminal Justice Section Archive, AM. BAR Ass'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal-justice-section-archive.html (follow "Special
Functions of the Trial Judge," "Mental Health," "Pleas of Guilty," "Providing Defense Services,"
"Sentencing," and "Speedy Trial" side bar hyperlinks) (last visited May 23, 2011). The Author leaves
for another day a discussion of why it is important to have links that allow one to easily cross-reference
applicable portions of Criminal Justice Standards. These cross-references should not be internal to one
specific part of the Standards, such as the Prosecution Function, but rather should allow for reference
to other applicable sections. A step in this direction is seen in the proposed Standards, which explicitly
provides that "[o]ther ABA Criminal Justice Standards should also be consulted for more detailed
consideration of the performance of prosecutors in specific areas." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-l.I(c) (Proposed Revisions 2010). In this regard, the Prosecutorial
Investigative Standards is used as an example. Id.
May 20I1I] I 163
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on which edition of the Standards is being examined. This next Part of
the Essay examines this initial provision in the Standards.
A. FIRsT EDITION
The initial Standards relating to the Prosecution and Defense
Function were approved by the ABA House of Delegates in February
1971." The general introduction to the Standards provides an
understanding of the "need to cast as much light as possible on the
nature of the lawyer's role and function in criminal justice."20 Three
"contexts" are noted: (I) "education of law students, the bar and the
bench"; (2) "the public needs to know what it should commend and what
it should condemn in the conduct of lawyers"; and (3) "clarification of
standards is essential... in the internal regulation and discipline of the
profession.""
Beyond the introduction, one finds the role of the Standards stated
in the opening section of the Prosecution Function, Standard i.i, in
subsection (e): "'unprofessional conduct'. . . is or should be made subject
to disciplinary sanctions."" It further states that other terms used in the
Standards were intended "as a guide to honorable professional conduct
and performance."2 3 The drafters state, however, that the Standards were
not "intended as criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct
of the prosecutor to determine the validity of a conviction."24 That said,
the Standards "may or may not be relevant in such judicial evaluation,
depending upon all the circumstances."" The drafters modified some of
this language from an earlier draft "to bring the standards into closer
conformity to the Disciplinary Rules of the [then] new Code of
Professional Responsibility.",,6 Subsection (e) of Standard i.i was one of
the sections modified when the Standards reached the final stages before
passage by the ABA. The reason given by the drafters for this
modification was to "avoid the implication that disciplinary proceedings
could be predicated upon violation of a standard, in lieu of a Disciplinary
Rule. "27
19. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCrION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
(Approved Draft i97i).
20. Id. intro. at 9.
21. Id. intro. at 9-o.




26. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION intro. at I
(Approved Draft 1971).
27. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCHON § I.I(c) crnt. (Approved Draft 1971).
I1164 [Vol. 62:I1159
THE ROLE OF THE STANDARDS
The first edition of the Defense Function Standards matched those
for the Prosecution Function on the specific role of the Standards."
Unprofessional conduct could be used for discipline, but only when a
disciplinary rule supplied the basis for the disciplinary sanction."9 Here
again, a Standards violation could not be used as the basis for a judicial
evaluation-for defense attorneys the context for disciplinary sanction is
the "evaluation of effectiveness of counsel."3 o But, conduct found to be a
violation of the Standards could be relevant evidence in the judicial
determination of the effectiveness of counsel.3
The drafters of this first edition had concerns about the Standards'
effectiveness. They did not have power to recommend sanctions for
enforcement, yet they stated in the introduction to the Prosecution
Function Standards that they wanted the project not to be merely
hortatory." They hoped the Standards would "clarify[] the role and
function of the prosecutor," and "also serve as a yardstick for a sound
evaluation of his performance by the public, the profession and by each
prosecutor for himself."33
B. SECOND EDITION
The second edition, approved by the ABA House of Delegates on
February 12, 1979,34 followed slightly less than ten years after its
predecessor. The introduction to the Prosecution Function Standards
notes "that most of the original black letter standards have stood the test
of time."33  Changes from the first edition fall into three general
categories: "(i) changes in concepts of what constitutes the most
acceptable prosecution practice, (2) significant legal developments, or in
several instances, (3) errors in phraseology contained in the first edition.36
With respect to Prosecution Function Standard i.i(e), the changes fell
within the third group, because they were merely stylistic. The Defense
Function Standards again matched that of the Prosecution Function
Standards, although contextually it differed in that it dealt with




32. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION intro. at 24 (Approved Draft 1971)
("The mandate of this Advisory Committee does not include the recommendation of sanctions to
enforce the standards promulgated, but it cannot be too strongly emphasized that without a
willingness of judges and the bar to assume the responsibility for enforcement, canons and codes of
conduct and standards such as recommended in this and the other reports in the Project will remain
hortatory.").
33. Id.
34. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (2d ed. 1980).
35. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION intro. at 3-4 to 3-5 (2d ed. 5980).
36. Id. intro. at 3-5.
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ineffectiveness of counsel as opposed to prosecutorial misconduct. Here
again, the changes were stylistic.
C. THIRD EDITION
Prior to the third edition, the opening section of the Standards was
titled "The Function of the Prosecutor."37 The role of the Standards was
one provision within this initial Standard 1.1.38 The third edition"
modifies this presentation in two ways.4 o First, it changes the title to "The
Function of the Standards" and focuses exclusively on the function of the
Standards as opposed to the function of the prosecutor.' All aspects
pertaining to the role of the prosecutor were moved into a later separate
Standard, Standard 3-1.2, titled "The Function of the Prosecutor."42
Second, the opening Standard on "The Function of the Standards"
changed. It omitted terms such as "unprofessional conduct" that had
been used in the two prior editions.43 As such, the third edition removes
references to what could be a basis for disciplinary action, albeit that the
Standards themselves could not serve in this role. The third edition opens
with the statement that "[t]hese standards are intended to be used as a
guide to professional conduct and performance."' It then reiterates what
was expressed in prior editions, that the Standards are "not intended to
be used as criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct of the
prosecutor to determine the validity of a conviction."45 It could, however,
be used as relevant evidence.46 In this regard the Defense Function
Standards further match the Prosecution Function Standards.47
D. PROPOSED FOURTH EDITION DRAFT
If the initial drafters expressed concerns about the hortatory nature
of the Standards, they most certainly would be less satisfied with the
fourth edition draft's treatment of the role that the Prosecution Function
37. Id. § 3-3. 1.
38. Id. § 3-3.1(e).
39. The Defense Function Standards were passed in February 1991, with commentary completed
in July 1992; the Prosecution Function Standards were approved in February 1992, with commentary
completed in July 1993. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, at iii (3 d ed. 1993).
40. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1 (3d ed. 1993).
41. See id.
42. See id. § 3-1.2.
43. Compare id. § 3-1.1, with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1I
(Approved Draft 1971), and STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1 (2d ed.
1980).
44. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1 (3d ed. 1993).
45. Id.
46. Id. ("[It] may or may not be relevant in such judicial evaluation, depending upon all the
circumstances.").
47. Compare id., with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1-1 (3d ed. 1993).
[Vol. 62:II591166
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Standards should hold. Prior editions allow judges to use the Prosecution
Function Standards in examining evidence relating to a prosecutor's
conduct, although it has always been clear that the Standards are not
disciplinary rules.8 The fourth edition draft omits language about
whether the Standards can be used in a "judicial evaluation." It explicitly
limits the Standards' application to a role of guidance, and for the first
time, the Prosecution Function Standards affirmatively state that they
''are not intended to serve as the basis for the imposition of professional
discipline, or to create substantive or procedural rights for accused or
convicted persons."49 To further protect prosecutors, the Prosecution
Function Standards added language stating that "[t]hese Standards are
not intended to create a standard of care for civil liability or to serve as a
predicate for a motion to suppress or exclude evidence or dismiss a
charge."o The addition of language precluding the use of the Prosecution
Function Standards for civil liability is indicative of recent concerns that
prosecutorial immunity will not always preclude civil liability for acts of
misconduct." Knowing that prosecutors can face civil liability for their
acts, the drafters made certain that the Prosecution Function Standards
could not be used in this process." Although this language is not
reflected in the proposed revisions of the Defense Function Standards, it
may only be a matter of time before the applicable portions are similarly
altered, as there seems to be a strong influence to match the language of
the Prosecution Function with that of its counterpart."
E. LINEAR ANALYSIS OF THE STANDARDS
From the beginning, it has been clear that the Standards were not
intended as a basis for disciplinary action. Language initially used in the
first edition of the Standards allowed for discipline under disciplinary
rules, but only when there was a mandated rule violation. Additionally,
48. See supra notes 24 & 45 and accompanying text.
49. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-I.I(b) (Proposed Revisions
2oo). The Standard was also enlarged to provide a definition of the term "prosecutor," id. § 3-1.i(a),
and to note the existence of other Criminal Justice Standards, such as the Prosecutorial Investigative
Standards, id. § 3-I.I(c).
So. See id § 3-1.1(b).
51. See generally Joel B. Rudin, Suing for Prosecutorial Misconduct, CHAMPION, Mar. 20Io, at 24
(discussing the present status of the law regarding immunity for prosecutors).
52. Drafters considering this provision examined it prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Connick v. Thompson, which held that a district attorneys' office was not "liable under section 1983
for failure to train based on a single Brady violation." 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). Prior cases had
provided immunity from civil suit when the prosecutor acted within the scope of her office. See, e.g.,
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,427-28 (1976).
53. On the other hand, some of the prosecutorial concerns regarding immunity may not be
reflected in the law against criminal defense attorneys. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-26




several editions of the Standards clearly authorized the judiciary to look
to these Standards as indicative of a norm.
Although some may claim that there has been little development in
the role of the Standards over the course of the different editions, the
changes in the language arguably demonstrate a movement toward using
the Standards as internal guidance within the prosecution or defense
office, as opposed to being a source used by outsiders. If true, this
progression may place the Standards in the position of being less subject
to court use. But, we do not know at this point whether courts will
continue to look to the Standards when an issue arises concerning the
conduct of a prosecutor or defense attorney. This is a concern that should
be considered in adopting the new language in the proposed revisions.
II. COURT USAGE
The Honorable Martin Marcus highlights, in a 2oo9 article, the
extensive court usage of the Standards by the judiciary.54 Looking solely
at reported decisions, a basis that clearly is not indicative of total usage,
he reports 120 Supreme Court and 700 federal circuit court decisions
using the Criminal Justice Standards."s He notes their appearance in
places like law reviews, legislative discussions, and law school
casebooks."
Looking solely at the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards
reduces these numbers. In searches using both Westlaw and Lexis, with
terms that attempt to ascertain a good sampling of cases using one of
these Standards, it appears that there are more federal cases referencing
the Defense Function Standards' than the Prosecution Function
Standards." It is also apparent that there are a greater number of cases
using these Standards in the past ten years, despite the Prosecution and
54. See Marcus, supra note ii, at so-ii.
55. Id. at iI.
56. Id. at 12-13.
57. The searches used the following terms and connectors: "ABA Standards" W/2 "Criminal
Justice" w/5 "Prosecution Function," and "ABA Standards" wl2 "Criminal Justice" wl5 "Defense
Function."
58. A search using "ABA Standards" W/2 "Criminal Justice" w/5 "Defense Function" produced
the following results:
* Westlaw: Allfeds-9o
* Lexis: FederalCourt Cases, Combined-91
* westlaw: Allstates-223
* Lexis: StateCourt Cases Combined-264
59. A search using "ABA Standards" w/2 "Criminal Justice" w/5 "Prosecution Function"
produced the following results:
* Westlaw: Allfeds-63
* Lexis: FederalCourt Cases, Combined-67
* westlaw: Allstates-254
* Lexis: StateCourt Cases Combined-3og
I168 [Vol. 62:II59
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Defense Function Standards having been in existence for close to forty
years.60 Often, courts cite to both the Prosecution and Defense Function
Standards but then only reference a particular Standard from one
section. Using key search terms and looking solely at the last ten years
generates a sample of fifty-three federal cases that provide a combined
reference to either the Prosecution Function Standards or the Defense
Function Standards. 62 Of these fifty-three federal cases, twelve cite to a
Prosecution Function Standard' and forty-one to a Defense Function
Standard'# although in both instances the case may speak generally in
6o. Limited to the last ten years, a search using "ABA Standards" wl2 "Criminal Justice" w/5
"Prosecution Function" produced the following results:
* Westlaw: Allfeds-31
* Lexis: FederalCourt Cases, Combined-3o
* Westlaw: Allstates-102
* Lexis: StateCourt Cases Combined-1r9
Limited to the last ten years, a search using "ABA Standards" w/2 "Criminal Justice" w/5 "Defense
Function" produced the following results:
* Westlaw: Allfeds-46
* Lexis: FederalCourt Cases, Combined-45
* Westlaw: Allstates-II2
* Lexis: StateCourt Cases Combined- 123
61. See supra note 57.
62. Searches that used abbreviations, other terms, and different variations of terms might have
provided a broader range of cases.
63. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769 (2009); United States v. Coppa, 267 F-3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001);
United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2oo); United States v. Monday, 8 F. App'x 394 (6th Cir.
2001); People v. Ford, Nos. 76/2oo8, Io9/2oo8, 2009 WL 2058701 (V.I. Super. Ct. July 7, 2009); United
States v. Manners, No. 3:o5-CR-220-M, 2oo6 WL 3o261o (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2oo6); United States v.
Vitillo, No. CR. 03-555, 2005 WL ioo6287 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2005); United States v. Acosta, iii F.
Supp. 2d 1o82 (E.D. Wis. 2000); United States v. Lewis, 61 M.J. 512 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005);
United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175 (C.A.A.F. 2005); United States v. Carmichael, No. NMCCA
9901271, 2004 WL 720161 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2004); United States v. Quiroz, 55 M-J. 334
(C.A.A.F. 2001).
64. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (20io); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242
(2oo8); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 20o0); Nellum
v. McGrath, 2o8 F. App'x 526 (9 th Cir. 2oo6); Roberson v. Adams, 17o F. App'x 462 (9th Cir. 2oo6);
Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3 d 376 (7th Cir. 2005); Thompson v. Bell, 315 F-3 d 566 (6th Cir. 2003);
Roccisano v. Menifee, 293 F-3d 51 (2d Cir. 2002); Mitchell v. Mason, 257 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2001);
Sandoval v. Martal, No. 2:0 7 -cv-oooo4-RSM-JLW, 2010 WL 3075646 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010); United
States v. Hubenig, No. 6:o3-mj-o4o, 200 WL 2650625 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 20o); Larsen v. Adams, 718 F.
Supp. 2d 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2010); United States v. Holbrook, No. 2:01CRIoo23 , 2010 WL 343381 (W.D.
Va. Jan. 23, 2010); Moore v. Decamp, No. o8-1o87-MO, 200 WL 174137 (D. Or. Jan. 13, 201o); Stuck
v. United States, Nos. 2:o4-cr-ooI9o, 2:O8-cv-00240, 2oo9 WL 6765306 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 24, 2009);
United States v. Rose, 3:o6-cr-177, 2009 WL 3614814 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2009); Santiago v. United
States, Nos. 09-1334, o8-478, 2009 WL 2391284 (D.N.J. July 30, 2009); Dumas v. United States, Nos.
5:07-cv-00795, 5:04-cr-00058-i, 2009 WL 1073697 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 3, 2009); Jones v. United States,
No. 07 C 5546, 2oo8 WL 5411768 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 24, 2oo8); United States v. De Castro-Font, 583 F.
Supp. 2d 243 (D.P.R. 2oo8); Sylvester v. Ortiz, No. 05-cv-02377-MSK-MJW, 2008 WL 4543100 (D.
Colo. Oct. 10, 2oo8); McDonald v. McCann, No. o5 C 820, 2008 WL 4696164 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2oo8);
United States v. Kamerud, No. CRol-4o6o MWB, 2007 WL 4553354 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 20, 2007);
Morris v. United States, Nos. 2:05-cr-ooI25, 2:o6-cv-00938, 2007 WL 5674491 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 5,
2007); Miller v. Terhune, 51o F. Supp. 2d 486 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Pyatt v. United States, Nos. 3 :0 7 CVi 3 9 -
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terms of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecution and
Defense Functions without referring explicitly to prosecution or defense
standards.'
In the fifty-three federal cases from the last ten years supplied in
this sample, references to the Prosecution Function Standards have
focused on claims of prosecutor misconduct in a host of areas. One finds
discussion relating to closin argument to the jury," failing to disclose
evidence by the prosecutor, problems concerning charging discretion,6
problems concerning the investigative function of the prosecutor,6 not
2-V, 3:o4CRI33-V, 2007 WL 2226019 (W.D.N.C. July 31, 2007); Corcoran v. Buss, 483 F. Supp. 2d 709
(N.D. Ind. 2oo7); Venson v. United States, Nos. 2:05-cv-00454, 2:or-cr-00261-o6, 2007 WL 518419 (S.D.
W. Va. Feb. 13, 2007); Umburger v. United States, Nos. 1:03-0291, i:oo-0204, 2oo6 WL 2786802 (S.D.
W. Va. May 16, 2oo6); Tice v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 2d 676 (W.D. Pa. 2006); Williams v. United States,
4 :05 CV2I 7 6-SNL, 2006 WL 680928 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 16, 2oo6); Smith v. United States, Nos. 2:99-cr-
oo198-3, 2:05-cv-00431, 2oo6 WL 4o63032 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. I, 2oo6); Van Harris v. United States,
Nos. 2:oi-cr-00261-7, 2:oI-cr-oo780, 2005 WL 5178502 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 15, 2005); Thomas v. Beard,
388 F. Supp. 2d 489 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Geiger v. United States, Nos. 2:o5-cv-00166, 2:oi-cr-00261-05,
2005 WL 5202io6 (S.D. W. Va. July 19, 2005); Porras v. United States, No. CV-oo-2244 (DGT),
2004 WL io64754 (E.D.N.Y. May II, 2004); Newton v. Coombe, No. 95 CIV 9437 GEL, 200 WL
799846 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2001); United States v. Bresnahan, 62 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. 2005); United
States v. Wiest, 59 M.J. 276 (C.A.A.F. 2004); United States v. Garcia, 57 M.J. 716 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. 2002).
65. This combined number explains the difference between the total of fifty-three cases and the
breakdown of cases seen earlier. See discussion supra note 6o. The breakdown in that note does not
reflect the overlap when both sets of Standards are referenced.
66. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.8 (3d ed. 1993); see Carter,
236 F-3d at 785 (citing the Standards in support of the holding that the prosecutor's misstatement of
evidence during closing arguments was plain error); Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 179-80, 182-83 (citing to the
Standards in the context of the trial counsel's improper interjection of personal beliefs and improper
disparaging comments about the defendant during closing arguments).
67. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1I(a) (3 d ed. 1993); see Cone,
129 S. Ct. at 1783 n.15 (mentioning that the Brady disclosure rule requires less of the prosecution than
the Standards, specifically Standard 3-3.1(a)); Coppa, 267 F.3 d at 141-42 (.'[T]he current Brady law'
imposes a disclosure obligation narrower in scope than the obligation [under the Standards] to disclose
all evidence favorable to the defendant." (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (995))).
68. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993); see Quiroz,
55 M.J. at 340 (citing to the Standards in a discussion about the prosecutor's discretion in bringing
criminal charges against a defendant); see also Ford, 2009 WL 2058701, at *8-9 & n.13 (using the
Standards as support in the court's determination that the prosecutors violated their ethical
obligations by bringing criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence).
69. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1(g) (3d ed. 1993); see United
States v. Manners, No. 3 :o5 -CR-220-M, 2oo6 WL 302611o, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2006) ("Unless a
prosecutor is prepared to forgo impeachment of a witness by the prosecutor's own testimony as to
what the witness stated in an interview or to seek leave to withdraw from the case in order to present
the impeaching testimony, a prosecutor should avoid interviewing a prospective witness except in the
presence of a third person." (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-
3.I(g)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Vitillo, No. CR. 03-555, 2005 WL
roo6287, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2005) (using the Standards as a guide to determine the prosecutor
does not engage in impermissible vouching by noting in his opening statement that he attended the
initial FBI interview of the defendant).
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meeting the standards at an initial appearance, courtroom
professionalism,7' and a general statement reminding trial counsel that
"[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."72
Those court opinions that focus on a Defense Function Standard
very often arise in the context of alleging an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. The two Standards that seem to appear the most often
with these claims pertain to advice given to the accused 73 and the duty of
counsel to investigate. But federal cases in the last ten years cite to
other Standards. One finds references to Standards on the "control and
direction of the case," the importance of prompt action by defense
70. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.Io(a) (3d ed. 1993); see
United States. v. Acosta, iii F. Supp. 2d 1o82, 1092-93 & n.9 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (looking to Standard 3-
3.io(a), which governs a prosecutor's role at a defendant's first appearance in front of a judicial
officer, for guidance in the context of the prosecutor's responsibilities before formal proceedings are
initiated).
71. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.2 (3d ed. 1993); see United
States v. Lewis, 61 M.J. 512, 517 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (citing to the Standards to determine
counsel's unlawful command influence in forcing a detailed military judge's recusal).
72. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c) ( 3 d ed. 1993); see United
States v. Carmichael, No. NMCCA 9901271, 2004 WL 720161, at *8 n.2 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 22,
2004) (citing to Standard 3-1.i(c), although the relevant text is in Standard 3-1.2(C)).
73. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.1 (3 d ed. 1993); see, e.g., Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481-82 (2010) (referencing the Standards to discuss counsel's failure to
properly advise a client of the immigration consequences of a plea).
74. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993); see Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387-88 (2oo5) (using the second edition of the Standards and referencing the
third edition to determine whether defendant's counsel's investigation efforts were reasonable);
Howard v. Clark, 6o8 F.3d 563, 569-70 (9th Cir. 20o0) (using the Standards' measure of reasonableness
to determine whether defense counsel adequately investigated a witness's identification); Thompson v.
Bell, 315 F.3 d 566, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., dissenting) (using the Standards' reasonableness
standard to determine a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim); United States v. Russell,
221 F-3 d 615, 620-21 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting the Standards before determining that defense counsel's
failure to confirm the status of two of the defendant's three prior convictions was unreasonable);
Larsen v. Adams, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (using the Standards to "reflect" the
importance of investigation before determining defense counsel had been ineffective due to a failure
to investigate and locate exculpatory witnesses); Miller v. Terhune, 5io F. Supp. 2d 486, 499 (E.D. Cal.
2007) (using the Standards as guidance to determine that defense counsel had been ineffective due to
the failure to investigate a defendant's mental impairment); Corcoran v. Buss, 483 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714
(N.D. Ind. 2007) (mentioning that defense counsel sought more time to file for post-conviction relief
due to its investigatory obligations under the Standards); Tice v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 2d 676, 702
(W.D. Pa. 2oo6) (citing the investigatory responsibilities under the Standards before determining that
defense counsel was unreasonable to rely on defendant's memory and should have further investigated
an alibi).
75. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993); see Gonzalez v.
United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248-50 (2oo8) (referring to the Standards' commentary regarding
counsel's having control of major decisions in the case); Moore v. Decamp, No. o8-1o87-MO, 2010 WL
174137, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 13, 2010) (citing the Standards' principle that counsel shall make tactical
decisions to determine that defense counsel appropriately consulted his client regarding juror
preferences); Dumas v. United States, Nos. 5:07-cv-00795, 5:04-Cr-ooo58-I, 2009 WL Io73697, at *9
(S.D. W. Va. Feb. 3, 2009) ("The choice and litigation of pre-trial motions in a criminal case are
strategic and tactical decisions which should be made by defense counsel after consultation with the
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counsel to protect the accused,6 and the duty to keep one's client
informed of the legal proceedings." A court has also cited to the
Standard concerning privileged communications between lawyer and
client in prisons and other custodial facilities.5 Cases regarding
sentencing,79 post-trial motions,8 and appeals' also provide a forum for
referencing the Defense Function Standards.
Although clearly there are more cases in the state systems that
reference the Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecution and Defense
Functions, it is apparent that there is a wide breadth of different conduct
that triggers the Standards. The only common theme is that many of the
cases referencing the Prosecution Function use it to claim misconduct on
the part of a prosecutor, and those cases referencing the Defense
Function use it to examine ineffectiveness on the part of the defense
attorney.
In addition to the fact that these searches may not capture all the
appellate decisions citing to the Standards, it is important to note that
these examples and numbers fail to reflect the many possible unreported
client." (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2(b) (3d ed. 1993)));
Sylvester v. Ortiz, No. 05-CV-02377-MSK-MJW, 2008 WL 45431oo, at *13 (D. Colo. Oct. so, 2008)
(citing the Standards for the principle that counsel shall make tactical decisions to determine that
disagreement as to jury selection cannot sustain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); McDonald
v. McCann, No. 05 C 820,2008 WL 4696164, at *ii (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2008) (using the Standards as a
reference when stating the general principle that a jury instruction on a lesser offense is a tactical
decision made by defense counsel, but requires consultation with the defendant); United States v.
Kamerud, No. CRoi-4o6o MWB, 2007 WL 4553354, at *34 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 20, 2007) (citing the
Standards' explanation that tactical decisions are left to defense counsel to support the holding that a
defense counsel's failure to prepare adequately is not excused by a failure to obtain defendant's
consent to file a motion for a continuance).
76. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.6 (3d ed. 1993); see Morris v.
United States, Nos. 2:05-cr-ool25, 2:o6-cv-oo938, 2007 WL 5674491, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 5, 2007)
(using the Standards as the objective standard of reasonableness to determine whether defense
counsel effectively protected a defendant's rights in the absence of a motion to suppress).
77. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.8 (3d ed. 1993); see Roberson v.
Adams, 17o F. App'x 462, 464-65 (9th Cir. 2oo6) (Paez, J., dissenting) (using the Standards to
determine that defense counsel acted unreasonably and ineffectively by advising defendant to reject a
plea agreement).
78. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.I(c) (3d ed. 1993); see Mitchell v.
Mason, 257 F.3 d 554, 575 n.i (6th Cir. 2001) (Carr, J. dissenting) (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.1(c) (3d ed. 1993)).
79. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-8.1 (3d ed. 1993); see Canaan v.
McBride, 395 F.3d 376, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2005) (looking to the Standards for guidance in determining
that defense counsel's performance was inadequate in a death penalty case, because defense counsel
failed to advise the defendant of his right to testify at the penalty phase).
8o. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-7.9 (3d ed. 1993). See generally
Larsen v. Adams, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (referencing the Standards in determining
whether counsel timely filed a new trial motion).
81. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-8.3 ( 3 d ed. 1993); see Venson v.
United States, Nos. 2:05-cv-00454, 2:oI-cr-0o261-o6, 2007 WL 518419, at *13 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 13,
2007) (discussing the duties of appellate counsel and when those duties cease under the Standards).
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instances in trial courts, disciplinary matters, law review articles, and in
the offices of prosecutors and defense attorneys across the United States.
One would think that it is the latter group that would hopefully reference
the Standards the most often.
III. SELECTION OF JURORS - PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
This Essay now considers the role of the Standards, looking at one
particular Standard, the selection of jurors. Considered here is whether
the Standards could offer more guidance to prosecutors and defense
counsel.
The selection of jurors is a hotbed for Supreme Court litigation,
with cases prohibiting the use of race" and genders' in excluding jurors
on peremptory challenges.8' One also finds many judicial opinions
affirming the impropriety of using nationality and ethnicity when striking
jurors peremptorily.s In contrast to the courts' recognition of
impermissible peremptory juror challenges motivated by one of the
above designations, or by religion, the judiciary has given little attention
to peremptory challenges premised on sexual orientation, absent a state
bar or state constitutional requirement.86 Without intermediate or
heightened scrutiny, there is seldom constitutional relief for the category
of sexual orientation when gays and lesbians are deliberately struck from
a jury because of their status.
This deficiency in the law is mirrored in both the ABA Task Force's
proposal and the proposed revisions of the Criminal Justice Standards
for Prosecution and Defense Functions." The Task Force writes, "A
82. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,89 (1986).
83. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 138-42 (1994).
84. See generally Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence ofJuror Bias, 27 HARV. J.
ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. (forthcoming 201) (discussing post-Batson cases that have extended
prohibitions of discriminatory practices).
85. See generally 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(d), at 129 n.193 (3 d ed.
2oo9) (discussing cases that considered exclusion of jurors on the basis of nationality and ethnicity
during peremptory challenges).
86. See id. § 22.3 (d), at 131-32 f.201.
87. The Task Force did include "sexual orientation" in Standard 3-1.5, which states:
A prosecutor should not invidiously discriminate against, or in favor of, any person on the
basis of constitutionally or statutorily impermissible criteria. Such criteria may include
factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, political beliefs, age, or
social or economic status. A prosecutor should not use other improper considerations, such
as partisan or improper political or personal considerations, in exercising prosecutorial
discretion.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.5 (Proposed Revisions 2010); see also
Rory K. Little, Introduction: The ABA's Project to Revise the Prosecution and Defense Function
Standards, 62 HASTINGs L.J. IiiI, app. at 1127-28 (2011). Here again, the drafters are using permissive
language of "may" for criteria like "sexual orientation" but using mandatory language of "should"
when something is an impermissible criteria under the Constitution or by statute. Further this
Standard has no correlation to the jury selection, as it includes in the "may" category many criteria
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prosecutor should not strike jurors based on constitutionally or
statutorily impermissible criteria. [Some members would add: 'Such
criteria include factors such as race, gender, religion and national origin,
and may include other factors such as sexual orientation.']"88
Whether one limits this Standard to the first sentence or adds the
second sentence advocated by some committee members, the Task
Force's language represents a sad commentary on promoting equality in
our jury system. With some members of the Task Force wanting to limit
this provision exclusively to the existing constitutional or statutory
grounds, they offer nothing more than what is already required by law. In
this regard, the statement serves no purpose other than to tell
prosecutors or defense counsel what they should already know: they
must follow the law.
Adding the second sentence as suggested by some members of the
Committee provides an equally problematic solution in that it extends
the Standards to areas that might be somewhat constitutionally hazy for
peremptory challenges but then places sexual orientation on a different
footing than categories explicitly recognized, like race and gender. At
best, adding the second sentence emphasizes a discriminatory position by
failing to give equal footing to sexual orientation.
Equally disappointing is the language that the Task Force offers in
its revision, adopting a position to limit this area to constitutional and
statutory law.8 Endorsing a position that ratifies the status quo offers
little advancement for lawyers' conduct. One hardly needs the Standards
to accomplish this goal.
More importantly, the approach taken by these two groups misses
an opportunity to offer a positive approach under law. It is well known
that there is significant discrimination against gays, lesbians, and
transgendered individuals, both historically and currently. Hate crimes
reached a level in the United States that allowed for the passage of the
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act.'
Yet, when it comes to prosecutions under this Act, as well as other
criminal laws, adopting the position of the current proposed revisions
could mean that prosecutors and defense counsel could use peremptory
challenges to exclude gay, lesbian, and transgendered persons from
that clearly are permitted as a basis for peremptory strikes by both prosecution and defense.
88. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-7.3(a) (Proposed Revisions
2010) (emphasis omitted).
89. The proposed revisions for this Standard read as follows: "A prosecutor should not strike
jurors based on constitutionally or statutorily impermissible criteria, and should object if defense
counsel appears to do so." Id. § 3-6.3(a).
90. Pub. L. No. 111-84, H§ 4701-4713, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009). Statistics show that 15.9% of the hate
crimes reported with the FBI from 1998 to 2oo7 had sexual orientation as a factor. See Quinn
Bowman, Obama Signs Measure to Widen Hate Crimes Law, PBS NEwsHoUR (Oct. 28, 2009, 12:00
AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/politics/july-deco9/hatecrimeo-28.htmi.
[Vol. 62:11591 174
THE ROLE OF THE STANDARDS
serving on a jury in cases considering hate crimes based on sexual
orientation.
CONCLUSION
So what should be the role of the Standards? Should they simply be
a way to offer protection to prosecutors from civil liability? Should they
be the catalyst that moves oversight into internal offices with no
objective review? And should they merely restate existing law that is
already the subject of external scrutiny? Perhaps if the Standards serve
no effective role and have no enforcement, then it makes little difference
whether they are nothing more than a restatement of norms that are
codified in law or disciplinary rules.
The Standards, however, provide an opportunity to offer hortatory
advice" that can improve the legal process. It may seem insignificant to
some merely to add two words "sexual orientation" as a pronounced
criteria that limits when gays, lesbians, and transgendered individuals are
peremptorily excluded from a jury. But, for those who have suffered
discriminatory practices, it can serve as a symbolic recognition that gays,
lesbians, and transgendered individuals, as a class, have equal rights to
judge perpetrators of crimes. It also can offer a true cross-section of
society on the jury. Ultimately, taking a progressive approach in the
Criminal Justice Standards allows for change that can improve
prosecutorial and defense practices.
91. This Essay in no way advocates for using disciplinary rules or standards as a basis for criminal
liability. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Misconduct: Ethical Rule Usage Leads to Regulation
of the Legal Profession, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1323 (1988) (discussing the use of ethics rules in the criminal
trials of attorneys and judges).
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